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Abstract
We explore the relationship between relative physical attractiveness in the household
and the hours worked by married men and women. Using PSID data, we find that
husbands who are thinner relative to their wives work fewer hours, while wives who are
heavier relative to their husbands work more hours. These results are robust to
controlling for individual, spousal characteristics, and conventional distribution factors,
suggesting that high body weight leads to low Pareto weight in the household: fatter
spouses may compensate with more hours of work. Our household bargaining
interpretation is supported by the fact that we cannot statistically reject the collective
proportionality restriction when including measures of the distribution of relative
physical attractiveness in the population.
JEL codes: D1, J1, J22
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1 Introduction
Economists have been inquiring about the determinants of labor supply, the intra-
household allocation of resources, and the economic impact of physical attractiveness
for decades. Is there any common link among all these different forces? As illustrated
in the seminal work by Chiappori (1992), the family has considerable influence on the
behavior of its members, and in particular on their labor supply choices. The wife’s deci-
sion power, which depends on her characteristics and wellbeing outside marriage relative
to her spouse’s (relative age, wage, education, non-labor income, divorce laws, etc.), will
affect both her own and her husband’s allocation of hours of work. Although many stud-
ies have analyzed the role of spouses’ differences along several dimensions, the literature
has remained silent on the role of differences in physical attractiveness1. This is some-
what surprising, since relative attractiveness seems to be a relevant determinant of the
bargaining power of each spouse, and existing works directly link physical attractiveness
measures (e.g., photo ratings, body mass index) to several economic outcomes, such as
individual employment status, earnings, and even criminal activity (e.g., Hamermesh and
Biddle 1994; Mocan and Tekin 2010; Rooth 2009).
In this paper, we explore the relationship of relative physical attractiveness within the
household and the hours worked by married men and women, proxied by their relative
body mass index (BMI, weight-for-height). By establishing a link between body weight
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and Paretoweight in the household, our work is consistent with the long tradition in labor
supply research that emphasizes the family context in which work decisions are made
(e.g., Blau and Kahn 2007; Blundell andMaCurdy 1999; Chiappori et al. 2002). While own
weight (BMI) has already been linked to labor supply (Lakdawalla and Philipson 2007; Loh
2009), evidence from psychology explicitly points to fatness being stigmatized by spouses,
and that social pressures for slimness affect marital interaction (Sobal 1995). In particular,
it is the relative attractiveness within the couple which is thought to affect household
behavior. McNulty and Neff (2008) actually claim that how the discrepancy in spouses’
attractiveness affects household outcomes and satisfaction is still an open question.
We use a standard collective labor supply model (Chiappori et al. 2002) in which relative
physical attractiveness may influence the decision power of each spouse. It is known that
spouses’ relative characteristics and opportunities outsidemarriage shape their respective
intrahousehold bargaining power and share of household resources (e.g., Browning et al.
2012). Following Gregory and Ruhm (2011), Mansour and McKinnish (2011), Chiappori
et al. (2012), among others, we consider BMI as a proxy for physical attractiveness. View-
ing relative physical attractiveness through the lens of a collective labor supply framework
allows us to investigate its relationship with hours of work of both married men and
women. In such a context, relatively high body weight transforms into low Pareto weight
in the household, inducing individuals to compensate for their negative physical trait by
working more hours, while their spouses work less. Discrepancies in physical appearance
lead to a better position inside the household for the better-looking spouse, in terms of
intrahousehold allocation of resources, and thus of hours worked by husbands and wives.
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) on married heads and
their wives from 1999 to 2007, we show how relative attractiveness proxied by wife’s
BMI relative to husband’s BMI matters in explaining their annual hours of work. We
find that husbands who are thinner relative to their wives work fewer hours, while
wives who are heavier relative to their husbands work more hours. Acknowledging
that individuals working more hours may work in sedentary jobs (Lakdawalla and
Philipson 2007; Loh 2009) or consume more highly-caloric food to economize on the
scarcity of their time (Chou et al. 2004), we present estimates controlling for sedentary
job-type and the ratio of expenditures of food at home versus total food. We also account
for spousal characteristics and conventional distribution factors, and obtain virtually
identical results.
To uncover the bargaining power channel from the role of unobserved heterogeneity,
one may think of linking changes in relative body weight to changes in hours of work.
Unfortunately, (relative) body weight has weak time series variation in a short time span.
In addition, this variation is likely to reflect noise (e.g., measurement error due to self-
reporting). These two issues make first-differenced and within-OLS estimators unreliable
(e.g., Deaton 1995), and even undesirable (e.g., Choi 2012). Although we cannot ultimately
conclude that high body weight causes lower Pareto weight, we can offer indirect evidence
on this underlying relationship. First, we cannot reject the collective model restriction of
proportionality between the labor supply responses to the spouses’ relative BMI and the
ratio of means and standard deviations of these BMIs in the population. Second, we com-
pare the spouses’ labor supply responses to own BMI to those of unmarried individuals, to
distinguish within-family mechanisms from alternative ones. Although own BMI is posi-
tively related to hours of work for both married men and married women, no statistically
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significant relationship emerges for either unmarried men or unmarried women. Finally,
marital sorting along a dimension potentially correlated with future labor supply (we
focus on couples who have been married for at least 4 years) does not appear to interfere
with our results and their interpretation, since this matching would predict a negative
correlation between hours of work and own BMI, while we find positive correlations for
both men and women.
Our analysis is also related to the literature on the marriage market penalties of low
physical attractiveness. Heavier (or obese) men and women are found to be penalized
in the marriage market by matching with partners who are weaker along socioeco-
nomic dimensions, i.e., educational attainment and wages (Averett and Korenman 1996;
Hamermesh and Biddle 1994; Oreffice and Quintana-Domeque 2010). While negative
effects of own BMI on both labor- and marriage-market outcomes have been well-
documented (e.g., Averett et al. 2008; Cawley 2004; Garcia andQuintana-Domeque 2007),
our evidence indicates that the relative BMI within the couple reinforces these penalties
through the household decision process. Relatively heavier married individuals work more
hours to compensate their spouses for their defect, regardless of gender. More generally,
this study contributes to the understanding of labor supply of married men and women.
The estimated sizeable correlations of relative BMI and spouses hours of work, and with
opposite signs, are all the more remarkable given the acknowledged rigidities in hours
worked.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the conceptual framework.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results and discusses
potential alternative explanations. Section 5 concludes.
2 Conceptual framework
2.1 Measuring (relative) physical attractiveness
Our study analyzes the role of relative physical attractiveness on hours of work. Hence,
we first need to define how to measure physical attractiveness. There exists a consid-
erable literature in which weight scaled by height (body mass index, BMI) is used as a
proxy for socially defined physical attractiveness. Recent examples in economics include
Chiappori et al. (2012), Gregory and Ruhm (2011) and Mansour and McKinnish (2011).
Indeed, BMI is shown to be negatively related to physical attractiveness. Interestingly,
Rooth (2009) found that photos that were manipulated to make a person of normal weight
appear to be obese (BMI≥30) caused a change in the viewer’s perception, from attractive
to unattractive. In particular, BMI is reported to be the dominant cue for female physi-
cal attractiveness, while the waist-to-chest ratio (WCR) plays a more important role than
BMI in the case of male attractiveness (Swami 2008). However, it must be emphasized
that BMI andWCR are strongly positively correlated, and, not surprisingly, BMI is corre-
lated with the male attractiveness rating by women, though this correlation is lower than
the one with WCR (Tovée and Cornelissen 2001; Tovée et al. 1999; Wells et al. 2007).
We are not aware of any study with detailedmeasures of body shape and socioeconomic
characteristics which simultaneously provides these data for both spouses. Since BMI has
been shown to constitute a good proxy for both male and female physical attractiveness,
and evidence from psychology explicitly points to fatness being stigmatized by spouses
(Sobal 1995), we will consider this measure in our analysis. Specifically, to capture relative
attractiveness, we will use the wife’s relative BMI (the wife’s BMI divided by her husband’s
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BMI). Although BMI is neither the only nor the most important dimension of physical
attractiveness our ratio contains two comparable objective measures, which would not be
the case if using photo ratings or waist-to-hip ratio against waist-to-chest ratio.
2.2 A standard model
We apply the collective household labor supply model with distribution factors of
Chiappori et al. (2002), in its general version. A household is composed of two decision
makers, wife and husband, each having a distinct utility function on consumption and
leisure, and making Pareto-efficient decisions. In general, each individual utility can also
depend on his-her spouse’s consumption and leisure, including altruism, public consump-
tion, and positive or negative externalities. Let hi and Ci for i = 1, 2 denote member i’s
hours of work and consumption of a private composite good (whose price is normalized
to unity), with leisure time li = 1 − hi , y the household non-labor income, wi the wage
rate of spouse i, and zi possible preference parameters of spouse i. Finally, let s represent
the relative attractiveness of the two spouses, specifically spouse 1’s attractiveness with
respect to spouse 2’s. Opportunities outside marriage and personal qualities shape an
individual’s relative attractiveness, and are found to enhance a spouse’s role and decision
power in the household, affecting household choices2. The utility function of member i is
Ui(C1,C2, 1 − h1, 1 − h2, zi)3.
The optimal allocations of hours of work are determined by the following program:
max
{C1,C2,h1,h2}
λU1(C1,C2, 1 − h1, 1 − h2, z1) + (1 − λ)U2(C1,C2, 1 − h1, 1 − h2, z2)
subject to
C1 + C2 ≤ w1h1 + w2h2 + y
0 ≤ hi ≤ 1, i = 1, 2
where the corresponding (Pareto) weighting factor is λ(w1,w2, y, z1, z2, s), representing
the household decision process, and in particular spouse 1’s bargaining power. The scalar
function λ is assumed continuously differentiable in its arguments, non-negative, and can
be normalized to belong to [ 0, 1] without loss of generality. s measures the discrepancy
in spouses’ attractiveness, and we define it to be s = BMI1BMI2 , the BMI of individual 1 rel-
ative to the BMI of individual 2. In general, λ may also depend on other relative factors,
such as incomes or prices and any other characteristic of the household environment
that may affect the intra-household distribution of resources and thus the decision pro-
cess (Browning and Chiappori 1998; Browning et al. 1994; Vermeulen 2002). Here, we
focus on relative physical attractiveness, although we will include conventional as well as
population distribution factors later on.
In this framework, relative physical attractiveness of individual 1 with respect to indi-
vidual 2 increases the weighting factor λ (the weight on spouse 1’s utility function in the
household welfare function), while decreasing the relative importance of individual 2,
and thus affects the household choices of consumption and leisure (assuming that leisure
externalities are not too strong, i.e., an increase in λ has a negative (positive) effect on
h1 (h2)). Therefore, we predict that ∂λ∂s < 0, given that higher relative BMI of individual 1
is associated with relatively lower physical attractiveness.
Oreffice and Quintana-Domeque IZA Journal of Labor Economics 2012, 1:6 Page 5 of 21
http://www.izajole.com/content/1/1/6
Assuming interior solutions, and following Chiappori et al. (2002), we can state that the
couple’s Pareto-efficient decisions yield the following equilibrium labor supply functions
of the two spouses:
hi = Hi(w1,w2, y, λ(w1,w2, y, z1, z2, s), z1, z2) ∀i = 1, 2 with ∂H1
∂λ
















∂s < 0 (2)
Therefore, the hours worked by each spouse are negatively related to his/her level of rel-
ative attractiveness, ceteris paribus, in particular controlling for own and spouse’s wage,
and for the couple’s total non-labor income y. If having a relatively low BMI strengthens
a spouse’s relative outside opportunities and welfare, thus increasing his/her weight in
household decisions, he/she will work fewer hours. At the same time, we should observe
the opposite impact on the hours of his/her spouse, who would experience a decline in
his/her decision power, and thus workmore.
We will investigate these patterns for both married males and females, by testing
whether a wife (individual 1)’s hours of work are positively related to the relative BMI, s,
while her husband (individual 2)’s are negatively related to it. More body weight implies
less Pareto weight in the household, compensating their spouse for the negative physical
attribute by working more hours. In other words, lower (Pareto) weight of individual 1 in
the decision process should, by standard income effects, lead to an increase in individual
1’s labor supply and a reduction in individual 2’s, all else equal. These differences in
response to relative BMI would support the claim that hours of work are affected by the
physical attractiveness of both spouses through its relevance in the household decision
process, regardless of gender, and in addition to the individual and spousal characteris-
tics that are traditionally thought to affect labor supply (Blau and Kahn 2007; Browning
et al. 2012).
Our empirical analysis focuses on couples where both individuals are working, accord-
ing to the predictions by Chiappori et al. (2002) which were developed for married
working couples. In addition, Blundell et al. (2007) state that the case where both spouses
work is the one yielding the strongest identifying power for preferences and for the impact
of distribution factors on the division of household resources. Our labor supply analysis
is exactly in terms of intra-household bargaining and allocation of resources4.
3 Data description
Our empirical work uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The
PSID is a longitudinal household survey collecting a wide range of individual and house-
hold demographic, income, and labor-market variables. In addition, in the waves since
1999, the PSID provides the weights (in pounds) and heights (in feet and inches) of both
household heads and wives, which we use to calculate the BMI of each spouse, defined
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as an individual’s body weight (in kilograms) divided by the square of his or her height
(in meters)5.
In each of the survey years under consideration (1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007), the
PSID comprises about 4,500 married households. We select households with a house-
hold head and a wife where both are actually present. In our sample years, all the married
heads with spouse present are males, so we refer to each couple as husband and wife,
respectively. We confine our study to white couples, and to those whose wife is between
26 and 48 years old, and whose husband is between 28 and 50 years old, given the aver-
age two-year intra-household age gap in the US (Chiappori et al. 2009). The lower and
upper bounds are chosen to focus on prime-age individuals, since our analysis concerns
labor supply behavior. We exclude individuals with work-limiting disability conditions, as
measured by reporting a physical or nervous condition that limits an individual’s type or
amount of work.
The analysis comprises white individuals for two reasons. First, the sample size for
black couples in the PSID is much smaller. Second, and more importantly, perceptions
of attractiveness regarding BMI can be very different between blacks and whites. Several
researchers argue that standards and experiences of beauty vary by gender and race (Craig
2006; Conley andMcCabe 2011). Moreover, following Conley and Glauber (2007), we dis-
card those individuals whose height and weight values include any extreme ones: a weight
of more than 400 or less than 70 pounds, a height above 84 or below 45 inches. We focus
on men whose BMI is between 20 and 40, and women between 18.5 and 40, thus exclud-
ing (medically) severely obese or underweight individuals (WHO 2009). In our sample,
there are no observations hitting the bounds of the wife’s relative BMI: the smallest value
is 0.523 (>18.5/40), and the highest value is 1.628 (<40/20).
Our main sample consists of working men and women, married to one another. Unlike
many previous studies (e.g., Averett and Korenman 1996; Averett et al. 2008; Hamermesh
and Biddle 1994), the focus is on actual partnerships, rather than on groups of husbands
and wives that are not necessarily associated to one another. This has the advantage to
assess labor supply outcomes actually decided at the household level. In particular, we
consider couples where both husbands and wives are working because our main predic-
tions regarding the role of BMI in the household are in terms of hours worked by both
spouses.
Because the PSIDmain files do not contain any direct question concerning the duration
of themarriages, we rely on the “Marital History File: 1985-2007” Supplement of the PSID
to obtain the year of marriage and number of marriages, to account for the duration of the
couples’ current marriage. We merge this information to our married sample using the
unique household and person identifiers provided by the PSID, and we consider married
couples who have been married for at least 4 years, to capture the role of intrahousehold
allocation of resources rather than unobserved heterogeneity due to sorting at the time of
the match.
In the PSID all the variables, including the information on the wife, are reported by the
head of the household. Reed and Price (1998) found that family proxy-respondents tend
to overestimate heights and underestimate weights of their family members, so that fam-
ily proxy-respondent estimates follow the same patterns as self-reported estimates (see
Gorber et al. 2007, for a review). The authors suggest that the best proxy-respondents
are those who are in frequent contact with the target. Since we are considering married
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couples, the best proxy-respondents are likely to be the spouses. Additionally, although
it is well-known that self-reported anthropometric measures are likely to suffer from
measurement error, Thomas and Frankenberg (2002) and Ezzati et al. (2006) showed that
in the United States, self-reported heights exaggerate actual heights, on average, and that
the difference is close to constant for ages 20–506.
In all of our regressions, the dependent variable is the log of annual hours worked,
defined in the PSID as “total annual work hours on all jobs, including overtime”. We focus
on individuals working more than 1000 annual hours if male, and 750 if female, and on
those earningmore than $5 per hour. These restrictions are meant to exclude couples who
are not really attached to the labor market. Specifically, those couples where the husband
works less than part-time (≤ 20 hours per week), and the wife works less than about 15
hours per week. Our final sample contains 2043 observations representing 997 couples
(approximately, 2.05 observations per couple).
The main explanatory variable is the ratio of the wife’s BMI to the husband’s BMI.
The control variables used in our analysis are: age; log hourly wage; non-labor income
(constructed as total family income minus the labor income of each spouse); education
(defined as the number of completed years of schooling and is top-coded at 17 for some
completed graduate work); health status (1 if excellent, very good, or good; 0 if fair or
poor); number of children in the household under 18 years; and a dummy variable for the
presence of children aged 2 years old or less (to control for a recent pregnancy).
In addition, occupation categories are considered to create a categorical variable for
sedentary job type, following the medical classification by Choi et al. (2010), and we also
create the ratio of the expenditures of food at home versus total food. This is to account
for the fact that individuals working more hours may work in sedentary jobs (Lakdawalla
and Philipson 2007) or consume more highly-caloric food to economize on the scarcity
of their time (Chou et al. 2004), and therefore exhibit a higher BMI. Finally, state dummy
variables or Census Bureau Division indicators are included to capture constant differ-
ences in labor and marriage markets across geographical areas in the US, such as the
proportion of obese men and women and cultural attitudes toward BMI and obesity.
As our analysis concerns several PSID waves, year dummy variables are also used. The
regression analysis uses the PSID-provided sample household weights7.
Table 1 contains the main descriptive statistics for our sample of married couples. The
average husband works 2361 hours per year, while the average wife works 1857 annual
hours. Part of this difference is due to the fact that we are focusing on couples were hus-
bands work more than 1000 hours (hence, excluding part-time husbands) and wives work
more than 750 hours. The average husband in our sample has a BMI of 27.7, so he is
overweight (25 ≤ BMI < 30), while the average wife is almost overweight, with a BMI
of 24.7. The average household has a non-labor income of approximately $9000 per year.
The spouses’ wage difference is $7, with the average husband earning $26.6 per hour and
the average wife having an hourly wage of $19.6. No mean differences between husbands
and wives are found in terms of either completed education, around 14 years, or health
status, 97% and 98%, for married men and women, respectively. The average age is 40 for
married men, and 38 for married women. The average number of children per house-
hold is 1.4, and in 10% of the cases, there has been a recent pregnancy. Finally, we note
that nearly 60% of husbands work in sedentary jobs, while this percentage is almost 90%
for wives.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Mean SD
Hours wife 1857.09 545.62
Hours husband 2361.24 512.81
BMI wife 24.68 4.38
BMI husband 27.69 3.82
Non-labor income 9224.45 34610.09
Hourly wage wife 19.61 13.15
Hourly wage husband 26.62 31.61
Age wife 38.53 5.91
Age husband 40.26 6.05
Education wife 13.97 2.07
Education husband 13.81 2.15
Good health wife 0.98 0.15
Good health husband 0.97 0.18
Recent pregnancy 0.10 0.30
Number of children 1.42 1.03
Sedentary job wife 0.86 0.34
Sedentary job husband 0.58 0.49
BMI wife/BMI husband 0.90 0.17
Food expenditure ratioa 0.70 0.17
N 2,043
Note: All Tables use PSID data, 1999–2007. Men aged 28–50 and working more than 1000 hours per year, women aged 26–48
working more than 750 hours per year, both earning more than $5 per hour and non-disabled. Marital duration of at least 4 years.
Sampling weights are used.
aFor food ratio N=2,025.
4 Empirical evidence
We start exploring the relationship between annual hours of work and relative attractive-
ness in Table 2. We run two regressions, for married men and women separately, of an
indicator of husband’s (wife’s) annual hours of work –which takes value 1 if the husband’s
(wife’s) works more than the average husband’s (wife’s) work hours, i.e., 2361 (1857)– on
a type of couple indicator –which takes value 1 if the relative wife’s BMI is higher than
the average relative BMI, i.e., 0.90– controlling for own age, state and year fixed effects.
In 45% of the couples, the wife’s BMI relative to her husband’s is higher than the average
BMI ratio. Themain results of the table are that wives who are relatively heavier than their
husbands are 6% more likely to work more hours than the average wife, while husbands
who are relatively thinner than their wives are 8% less likely to work more hours than the
average husband.
This table is consistent with the basic story presented above. A wife’s lower relative
physical attractiveness (or higher relative BMI) leads her to work more hours and her
Table 2 Regressions of annual hours of work indicators on type of couple indicator
I(Hours husband≥ 2361) I(Hours wife≥ 1857) Mean




Note: I (·) takes value 1 if the condition (·) is satisfied, and 0 otherwise. The regressions include own age, year and state fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the household id level are reported in parentheses. Sampling weights are used.
*** p-value< 0.01, ** p-value< 0.05, * p-value< 0.1.
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husband to work fewer hours, and conversely. However, while these findings are support-
ive of a standard collective model, they do not constitute clean tests of it because hours
worked depend at least on wages, which may be related to the BMI ratio.
4.1 Relative BMI in the household and hours worked
Table 3 presents the results of several regressions where the dependent variable is the
log annual hours of work of married men. In the first column we estimate a standard
labor supply equation, which postulates a log-linear relationship between hours of work
and wages controlling for a vector of demographic characteristics (age, education, house-
hold non-labor income, number of children, recent pregnancy, and health status), state
and year fixed effects. This is a prototype empirical specification that encompasses many
economic models of labor supply (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999). In the second column,
we add our measure of relative attractiveness between spouses, namely the ratio of wife’s
BMI to her husband’s. Consistently with our predictions, we find a negative significant
correlation between relative BMI and hours worked by married men, which corresponds
to an elasticity of roughly 6.5%, significant at the 5% level, while the estimated coefficients
associated to the hourly wage and other variables (results available upon request) do not
exhibit any significant change with respect to the previous column.
Acknowledging that individuals working more hours may work in sedentary jobs, we
also present estimates controlling for sedentary job-type, column (3). The estimated rela-
tionship between hours worked and relative BMI remains the same. In column (4), we
add the food expenditure ratio to account for the possibility that individuals working
more hours may consume more highly-caloric food to economize on the scarcity of their
time. This does not alter the estimated association between hours of work and relative
BMI, which is reassuring, although this variable may not directly capture the food caloric
content.
Finally, and in the spirit of the collective model of labor supply, in columns (5) and (6)
we present estimates that account for both spousal characteristics (age, education, log
Table 3 Regressions of husband’s log annual hours of work on wife’s BMI relative to
husband’s BMI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wife’s BMI/Husband’s BMI -- −0.069** −0.069** −0.076** −0.080** −0.088***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Log(Husband’s Wage) −0.041*** −0.044*** −0.044*** −0.048*** −0.040* −0.046**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022)
Demographic characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sedentary-job type NO NO YES YES NO YES
Food ratio NO NO NO YES NO YES
Spousal characteristics NO NO NO NO YES YES
Conventional distribution factors NO NO NO NO YES YES
N 2,043 2,043 2,043 2,025 2,043 2,025
Adj. R2 0.065 0.068 0.068 0.076 0.076 0.088
Note: All regressions include year and state fixed effects. Demographic characteristics include age, completed years of education,
a good health status indicator, household non-labor income, number of children, and a recent pregnancy indicator. Spousal
characteristics include age, completed years of education, a good health status indicator, and log hourly wage. Conventional
distribution factors include the spouses’ wage ratio, their age ratio, and their years of education ratio. Robust standard errors
clustered at the household id level are reported in parentheses. Sampling weights are used.
*** p-value< 0.01, ** p-value< 0.05, * p-value< 0.1.
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wage, and health status) and three conventional distribution factors (the spouses’ wage
ratio, their age ratio, and their years of education ratio). Our results are robust to these
additional adjustments.
Table 4 displays the same set of regressions for married women. As expected, relatively
heavier wives tend to work more hours. The relationship is robust and present in all the
specifications, as it is the case for married men, albeit not statistically significant in the
last column (p-value= 0.114). Although the wife’s estimated correlations between hours
of work and relative BMI are similar in magnitude, their standard errors are higher. This
is not surprising, and it can be understood in a classical measurement error world, as long
as the variance of the classical measurement error is higher when the household head
reports the measure of his/her spouse than when he reports his own.
We have explored the possibility that certain ranges are more important than others for
the relationship between hours of work and relative BMI. In particular, we have not found
evidence of differential correlations depending on the relative BMI of the couples being
within or out of the range from 0.74 (18.5/25) to 1.25 (25/20)8. These results are available
upon request.
Note that in columns (5) and (6) of Tables 3 and 4 we have included spousal character-
istics and conventional distribution factors. However, by estimating labor equations sep-
arately for husbands and wives, we were not using all the available information, since the
error terms in these equations are likely to be correlated. To account for this correlation,
we estimate in Table 5 the system of labor supply equations of husbands andwives by SUR,
i.e., allowing the errors terms to be correlated. The table contains two panels –according
to the controls included– with three rows each, corresponding to a different specifica-
tion in terms of geographic and time fixed effects. The estimated correlation between the
error terms, not reported in the table, is around 0.05 − 0.06, depending on the controls
included, and it is statistically different from zero at conventional levels. The same pic-
ture emerges, and the precision of the estimates increases (in general): wife’s relative BMI
is negatively correlated with her husband’s hours of work but positively with hers.
Table 4 Regressions of wife’s log annual hours of work on wife’s BMI relative to husband’s
BMI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wife’s BMI/Husband’s BMI -- 0.106** 0.103** 0.102* 0.087* 0.082
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Log(Wife’s Wage) 0.046** 0.048** 0.045** 0.038* 0.079** 0.070**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.031)
Demographic characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sedentary-job type NO NO YES YES NO YES
Food ratio NO NO NO YES NO YES
Spousal characteristics NO NO NO NO YES YES
Conventional distribution factors NO NO NO NO YES YES
N 2,043 2,043 2,043 2,025 2,043 2,025
Adj. R2 0.098 0.101 0.102 0.106 0.116 0.122
Note: All regressions include year and state fixed effects. Demographic characteristics include age, completed years of education,
a good health status indicator, household non-labor income, number of children, and a recent pregnancy indicator. Spousal
characteristics include age, completed years of education, a good health status indicator, and log hourly wage. Conventional
distribution factors include the spouses’ wage ratio, their age ratio, and their years of education ratio. Robust standard errors
clustered at the household id level are reported in parentheses. Sampling weights are used.
*** p-value< 0.01, ** p-value< 0.05, * p-value< 0.1.
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Table 5 SUR estimated coefficients on wife’s BMI/husband’s BMI
Withweights Without weights
Log (Husband’s Log (Wife’s Log (Husband’s Log (Wife’s
hours) hours) hours) hours)
Panel I. Spousal characteristics
a. State and year fixed effects −0.090 0.079 −0.088 0.075
(0.026)*** (0.038)** (0.026)*** (0.037)**
[0.031]*** [0.047]
b. Region and year fixed effects −0.065 0.081 −0.066 0.077
(0.026)** (0.038)** (0.026)** (0.037)**
[0.033]** [0.048]
c. Region, year, and region-by- −0.065 0.079 −0.066 0.076
year fixed effects (0.026)** (0.038)** (0.026)** (0.037)**
[0.033]** [0.048]
Panel II. Spousal characteristics and distribution factors
d. State and year fixed effects −0.088 0.082 −0.087 0.078
(0.026)*** (0.038)** (0.026)*** (0.037)**
[0.031]*** [0.048]
e. Region and year fixed effects −0.064 0.085 −0.065 0.080
(0.026)** (0.038)** (0.026)** (0.037)**
[0.033]* [0.048]*
f. Region, year, and region-by- −0.064 0.083 −0.065 0.078
year fixed effects (0.026)** (0.038)** (0.026)** (0.037)**
[0.033]* [0.049]
N 2,025 2,025
Note: Each row corresponds to a different SUR regression. All regressions include own log wage, food ratio, and demographic
characteristics (age, completed years of education, a good health status indicator, household non-labor income, number of
children, and a recent pregnancy indicator). Each husband’s (wife’s) regression includes a husband’s (wife’s) sedentary-job type
indicator. In addition, panel I includes spousal characteristics (age, completed years of education, a good health status indicator,
and log wage), and panel II includes both spousal characteristics and three conventional distribution factors (the spouses’ wage
ratio, their age ratio, and their years of education ratio). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors
clustered at the household id level based on 300 replications are reported in brackets.
*** p-value< 0.01, ** p-value< 0.05, * p-value< 0.1.
Overall, the evidence reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5 suggests that both men and women
are responsive to their relative BMI within marriage, and willing to alter their labor sup-
ply behavior. Although we cannot conclude that these correlations reflect causality, we
can provide indirect evidence of this compensation mechanism (i.e., a relative defect is
compensated with a quality) by looking at the relationship between individuals’ hours of
work and measures of the distribution of attractiveness in the population. This is the aim
of the next subsection.
4.2 The role of the distributions of physical attractiveness in the population
If relative attractiveness in the household matters for the allocation of resources, as our
results suggest, then the attractiveness distribution of men and women in the popula-
tion may also be relevant in shaping the intra-household allocation of resources, in terms
of outside opportunities. Hence, if our previous findings capture the fact that relative
BMI in the household affects spouses’ hours of work, we may find that the distributions
of BMIs in the marriage market matter as well. In this subsection we provide further
evidence on the link between relative physical attractiveness and the spouses’ hours of
work, and assess the plausibility of the intrahousehold bargaining mechanism by testing a
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simple restriction imposed by the collective model, namely the proportionality constraint
(Chiappori et al. 2002).
We characterize the distribution of physical attractiveness in the population by its mean
and standard deviation. The relevance of these moments can be easily understood in a
standard search model, where individuals look for suitable marriage partners and the
propensity to (re)marry falls as the reservationmarriage proposal rises9. The key determi-
nants of the reservation marriage proposal in our context are the means and the standard
deviations of male and female BMI. While an increase in the mean male (female) BMI
will decrease the reservation marriage proposal and search duration of women (men), the
effect of the standard deviation of BMI on the reservation marriage proposal can only
be unambiguously signed under the assumption of risk-neutral searchers and a mean-
preserving spread. In this case, the effect is positive. Reassuringly, the available empirical
evidence suggests that this is likely to be the case. Gould and Paserman (2003), Loughran
(2002), and more recently Bellou (2012) and Coughlin and Drewianka (2011), find evi-
dence that higher dispersion of male quality (measured by wage inequality) increases the
option value of waiting for potential better candidates for women.
In our framework, if an increase in the standard deviation of male BMI increases the
reservation marriage proposal and search duration of women, this will increase the bar-
gaining power of married men, decreasing their labor supply. Conversely, if an increase
in average male BMI decreases the reservation marriage proposal and search duration of
women, this will decrease the bargaining power of married men, increasing their labor
supply. However, because reservation marriage proposals should decrease slightly less
than proportionally to increases in the mean of the BMI distribution, we expect a small
effect for the mean (Loughran 2002). Hence, in terms of relative ratios of means and





























whereμ1 (μ2) is the mean BMI of married women (men) and σ1 (σ2) is the standard devi-
ation of BMI for married women (men), which are computed at the age-education-region
level. We consider the nine Census Bureau Divisions (New England, Middle Atlantic,
East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South
Central, Mountain, and Pacific), two educational levels (above and below the median
years of education, 14, which is the same for men and women in our sample), and two
age levels (for women, above and below the median age, 39; for men, above and below the
median age, 41). Thus, how favorable the relative BMI distribution is to men or women
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will depend on 24 combinations in each region, given that the search outcome depends
not only on the available partners but also on own “competitors” . Hence, the total number
of “marriage markets” is expected to be 144 (16 × 9).
In addition, given (1)-(4) the following testable proportionality constraint arises (see
















This prediction is very unlikely to be fulfilled unless the bargaining power explana-
tion and the collective household approach presented here are correct and applicable to
relative physical attractiveness as well.
In order to test these predictions, we estimate the regressions of row (b) of Table 5
adding sμ and sσ . We estimate the equations for husbands and wives simultaneously
(SUR), with and without weights, and report the estimated coefficients on the relative
BMI in the household, the corresponding ratio of the average BMIs in the population, and
the ratio of the standard deviations of these distributions. We can see in Table 6 that our
qualitative predictions are satisfied. The coefficients of relative physical attractiveness in
the household keep the expected opposite signs for married men and women. In addition,
the coefficients associated to the ratios of the averages and standard deviations exhibit
the signs predicted by equations (3)-(6), and the estimates of sσ are statistically signifi-
cant in all specifications. We then turn to test the proportionality constraint implied by
equation (7). The point estimates of the ratios are almost identical when using weights, –
0.768 and –0.751, and very similar without weights (–0.905 and –0.788). Not surprisingly,
we cannot statistically reject their equality (p-values of the Wald tests always higher than
0.86), supporting our household bargaining interpretation that the spouses’ relative BMI
is a bargaining-power force in the household decision process, and in labor supply deci-
sions in particular.We also present the corresponding proportionality tests of the product
of the coefficients. The same patterns arise, and the corresponding proportionality test
does not reject. These results are robust to excluding the ratio of BMI population means,
including conventional distribution factors, as well as to focusing only on couples belong-
ing to age-education-region cells with more than 35 observations (results available upon
request).
We conclude with an important remark. Our discussion of the role of the distribution
of physical attractiveness in the population highlights the challenge of implementing a
valid instrumental variable strategy for the relative spouses’ BMI in the household. The
corresponding ratios in the population, which in principle could be thought of as possible
instruments (e.g., Morris 2006,2007), are instead potential factors affecting household
bargaining power by themselves, and not only through the spouses’ relative BMI, which
invalidates them as instruments.
4.3 Alternative explanations
4.3.1 Alternative non-marriagemarket explanations: the unmarried
We have acknowledged that own weight (or BMI) has already been linked to labor supply
–individuals working more hours may work in sedentary jobs (Lakdawalla and Philipson
2007) or consume more highly-caloric food to economize on the scarcity of their time
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Table 6 SUR regressions of log annual hours of work onmeasures of relative attractiveness
in the household and in the population
With weights Without weights
Log (Husband’s Log (Wife’s Log (Husband’s Log (Wife’s
Hours) Hours) Hours) Hours)
Coefficients onmeasures of relative attractiveness
s =wife’s BMI/husband’s BMI −0.072 0.081 −0.072 0.077
(0.027)*** (0.039)** (0.026)*** (0.038)**
[0.027]*** [0.047]
sμ =average wife’s BMI/average −0.014 0.290 −0.010 0.321
husband’s BMI (0.151) (0.219) (0.153) (0.218)
[0.169] [0.257]
sσ = SD of wife’s BMI/SD of 0.094 −0.108 0.080 −0.097
husband’s BMI (0.027)*** (0.038)*** (0.026)*** (0.038)**
[0.030]*** [0.052]*
Collective model proportionality constraint
Within columns: Ratio of coefficients −0.768 −0.751 −0.905 −0.788
on s and sσ (0.356)** (0.446)* (0.447)** (0.493)
[0.513]* [0.663]
Wald Test of equality of ratios χ2(1) = 0.00 x2(1) = 0.03
p − value = 0.9773 p − value = 0.8642
Based on bootstrapped standard -- χ2(1) = 0.02
errors p − value = 0.9004
Across columns: Product of 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006
coefficients on s and sσ (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)*
[0.005] [0.005]
Wald Test of equality of products χ2(1) = 0.00 χ2(1) = 0.03
p − value = 0.9773 p − value = 0.8653
Based on bootstrapped standard -- χ2(1) = 0.02
errors p − value = 0.9017
N 2,025 2,025
Note: All regressions include year and region fixed effects, log wage, food ratio, demographic (age, completed years of education,
a good health status indicator, household non-labor income, number of children, and a recent pregnancy indicator) and spousal
characteristics (age, completed years of education, a good health status indicator, and log wage). In addition, husband’s (wife’s)
regression includes a husband’s (wife’s) sedentary-job type indicator. Conventional distribution factors: spouses’ wage ratio, their
age ratio, and their years of education ratio. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered
at the age-education-region level (136 groups) based on 300 replications are reported in brackets.
*** p-value< 0.01, ** p-value< 0.05, * p-value< 0.1.
(Chou et al. 2004)– and we have controlled for sedentary job-type and the food ratio.
However, these controls may not fully address the underlying correlations.
To single out the family-origin correlation of BMI and labor supply from alterna-
tive explanations, we implement a placebo test using the unmarried. If our bargaining
power mechanism is at work, ceteris paribus, we should find a positive relationship
between own BMI and own hours of work for both married men and married women.
Conversely, no relationship for either unmarried men or unmarried women should
emerge since they have no spouse to relate to, and therefore are not involved in any
intra-household bargaining.
In Table 7 we compare own-effects of BMI on hours of work between unmarried and
married individuals. Both for men and women, no statistically significant relationship
emerges between BMI and hours of work, and the magnitudes are smaller. In the first
panel, we use log(own BMI): the coefficient for married men is 2.5 times bigger than the
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one corresponding to unmarried men, while the coefficient for married women is 1.4
times bigger than the one corresponding to unmarried women. Similar results arise in the
second panel, where we use own BMI11. These comparisons should be interpreted with
some caution, though, given the small sample size of the unmarried and the potential
unobserved heterogeneity by marital status.
4.3.2 Alternativemarriagemarket explanations: unobserved heterogeneity at the time of the
match
We now explore the possibility that potential unobservable factors are biasing our pre-
vious estimates. In particular, we consider the possibility that labor supply is correlated
with some characteristic x (not observable to the econometrician) that is fixed but varies
across individuals, and is a relevant attribute at the time of the match. More specifically,
say that individuals match along two (observable to them) characteristics: BMI and x. It
can be shown that under some reasonable assumptions (see Appendix), if hours worked
is a proxy for x, own labor supply should be negatively related to own BMI –the intuition
being that x and BMI are substitutes in determining the attractiveness of an individual–
and that the ratio of coefficients on own and spousal BMI should be positive. However,
Table 8 suggests that none of these conditions is satisfied: own labor supply is positively
related to own BMI, and the ratio of coefficients on own and spousal BMI is negative.
Hence, it does not seem that matching along an unobserved trait potentially correlated
with future labor supply (we focus on couples who have been married for at least 4 years)
seriously jeopardizes our results and their interpretation.
Finally, while one may think of controlling for x (or indeed any other fixed characteris-
tic) using couple fixed effects, we need to bear in mind two important issues: First, this
strategy cannot account for reverse causality from changes in labor supply to changes in
body weight. Second, fixed-effect regressions suffer from several drawbacks: the varia-
tion in the right-hand side variable is reduced, and the attenuation bias of white noise
measurement error is exacerbated (e.g., Choi 2012, Deaton 1995). Indeed, controlling for
couple fixed effects, a regression of the log husband’s hours of work on his own weight
(in pounds) and her wife’s weight (in pounds) gives us the following coefficient estimates:
0.0002 (SE=0.0005) for own weight, and –0.00006 (SE=0.0006) for wife’s weight. These
qualitative results are consistent with our bargaining power mechanism, but the magni-
tudes are very small (virtually zero), reflecting an exacerbation of the attenuation bias.
Table 7 Regressions of log annual hours of work on own-BMImeasures bymarital status
Men Women
Panel I. Married Unmarried Married Unmarried
Log(Own BMI) 0.076* 0.030 0.096* 0.067
(0.043) (0.087) (0.055) (0.061)
Panel II.
Own BMI 0.003* 0.001 0.004* 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
N 2,043 838 2,043 1,020
Note: All regressions include own characteristics (age, log-hourly wage, completed years of education, a good health status
indicator, a sedentary-job type indicator, and -for women- a recent pregnancy indicator), household non-labor income, number
of children, state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the household id level are reported in parentheses.
Sampling weights are used.
*** p-value< 0.01, ** p-value< 0.05, * p-value< 0.1.
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Table 8 SUR of log annual hours of work of husbands and wives on log own BMI and log
spousal BMI
Log(Husband’s hours) Log(Wife’s hours)
Panel I. Individual and household characteristics
Log(Wife’s BMI) −0.054* 0.111***
(0.029) (0.042)
Log(Husband’s BMI) 0.098*** −0.063
(0.035) (0.051)
Panel II. Individual, household and spousal characteristics
Log(Wife’s BMI) −0.074*** 0.081*
(0.029) (0.042)
Log(Husband’s BMI) 0.097*** −0.052
(0.035) (0.051)
N 2,025
Note: Regressions, which are simultaneously estimated, include state and year fixed effects, individual (age, log-hourly wage,
completed years of education, and a good health status indicator) and household characteristics (household non-labor income,
food ratio, number of children and a recent pregnancy indicator. In addition, husband’s (wife’s) regression includes a husband’s
(wife’s) sedentary-job type indicator. Spousal characteristics: age, log-hourly wage, completed years of education, and a good
health status indicator. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value< 0.01, ** p-value< 0.05, * p-value< 0.1.
5 Conclusions
Our paper relies on the simple idea that body weight and Pareto weight are negatively
related, i.e., relative physical attractiveness matters for the intra-household allocation of
resources, and therefore for the hours worked by both spouses. This is appealing, we
think, in light of the absence in the literature of a link between the existing work high-
lighting the family context in which work decisions are made and those studies estimating
the impact of physical attractiveness in the labor market.
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) on married heads and
their wives from 1999 to 2007, we find that wives who are heavier relative to their hus-
bands work more hours, while husbands who are thinner relative to their wives work
fewer hours, also when controlling for sedentary job-type, the ratio of expenditures of
food at home versus total food, spousal characteristics, and conventional distribution fac-
tors. Our household bargaining interpretation is reinforced by the fact that we cannot
statistically reject the collective proportionality restriction when including measures of
the distribution of relative physical attractiveness in the population, and by the evidence
that no statistically significant relationship emerges for unmarried individuals.
Appendix
Unobserved heterogeneity at the time of match
Matching on x and BMI
Chiappori et al. (2012) consider a model in which individual “attractiveness” on the mar-
riage market is fully determined by a set of observable, say x (e.g., talent) and BMI , and
unobservable characteristics. Assuming that attractiveness is separable in the observable
characteristics, i.e., it depends on these variables only through some (unknown) index,
and that, conditional on the same indices, the distributions of observables and unob-
servables are independent, and using an additively separable model for the attractiveness
indices:
I(BMI1, x1) = a1BMI1 + b1x1
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J(BMI2, x2) = a2BMI2 + b2x2
where I (resp. J) is the attractiveness index for men (resp. women), a1, a2 < 0 and b1,
b2 > 0 –being fatter makes an individual less attractive, while being more talented makes
and individualmore attractive, ceteris paribus–, they show that the marginal rates of sub-
stitution between x and BMI (i.e., a1b1
and a2b2
), can be identified by regressing each wife
(husband) characteristic on her (his) spouse characteristics at the time of the match. For
spouse 1, one could simultaneously estimate the following two equations:
log(BMI1) = α0 + β1 log(BMI2) + γ1 log(x2) + ε1 (8)
log(x1) = α1 + β2 log(BMI2) + γ2 log(x2) + ε2 (9)
where ε1 and ε2 capture some sort of randomness.
And similarly for spouse 2:
log(BMI2) = π0 + δ1 log(BMI1) + ρ1 log(x1) + v1 (10)
log(x2) = π1 + δ2 log(BMI1) + ρ2 log(x1) + v2 (11)
where v1 and v2 capture some sort of randomness. In particular, the model by Chiappori











“Matching” on hours of work and BMI
Suppose that x is not observed, but assume that it is positively related with hours of work
h. Specifically, and for simplicity, x and h are related in the following way:
log(h1) = log(x1) + u1 (12)
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log(h2) = log(x2) + u2 (13)
where u1 and u2 are classical measurement errors.
Replacing expressions (12) and (13) into (8)-(11) we obtain:
log(BMI1) = α0 + β1 log(BMI2) + γ1 log(h2) + (ε1 − γ1u2) (14)
log(h1) = α1 + β2 log(BMI2) + γ2 log(h2) + (ε2 + u1 − γ2u2) (15)
log(BMI2) = π0 + δ1 log(BMI1) + ρ1 log(h1) + (v1 − ρ1u1) (16)
log(h2) = π1 + δ2 log(BMI1) + ρ2 log(h1) + (v2 + u2 − ρ2u1) (17)
The estimates in panels I and II of Table 9 are consistent with a1/b1 < 0 and a2/b2 < 0,
i.e., substitutability between BMI and x. Note, however, that the estimates of γ1, γ2, ρ1
and ρ2 reported in table 9 below suffer from attenuation bias due to (12) and (13). Not
surprisingly, the ratios of coefficients are very different.
Implications for ourmain results
What would happen if we were just capturing matching on x (i.e., an unobservable trait
correlated to future labor supply) when regressing labor supply on both own and spousal
BMI?
Replacing (17) into (15), we obtain:










log(BMI1) + η1 (18)
Similarly, replacing (15) into (17), we obtain:











































Table 9 SUR of log annual hours of work and log BMI
Panel I. Husband’s SUR regressions Log(Husband’s Hours) Log(Husband’s BMI)
Log(Wife’s Hours) 0.039** −0.011
(0.015) (0.010)
Log(Wife’s BMI) −0.062** 0.161***
(0.028) (0.018)
Panel II. Wife’s SUR regressions Log(Wife’s Hours) Log(Wife’s BMI)
Log(Husband’s Hours) 0.080** −0.045***
(0.032) (0.017)
Log(Husband’s BMI) −0.039 0.242***
(0.050) (0.027)
N 2,025
Note: Regressions, which are simultaneously estimated, include own and spousal characteristics (age, log-hourly wage,
completed years of education, a good health status indicator, and a recent pregnancy indicator), food ratio, household non-labor
income, number of children, state and year fixed effects. In addition, husband’s (wife’s) regression includes a husband’s (wife’s)
sedentary-job type indicator Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value< 0.01, ** p-value< 0.05, * p-value< 0.1.
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< 0. But even if 1 − γ2ρ2 < 0,
the ratio of coefficients should be positive. The estimates reported in Table 8 indicate
that none of these conditions is satisfied: own labor supply is positively related to (not
negatively), and the ratio of coefficients is negative (not positive). It does not seem that
matching along a dimension potentially correlated with future labor supply (we focus on
couples who have been married for at least 4 years) seriously jeopardizes our results and
their interpretation12.
Endnotes
1For example, Browning et al. (1994) have shown that differences in age and income
among the members of the household appear to be determinants of household out-
comes, such as consumption expenditures. Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) esti-
mate that which spouse receives the child allowance affects household decisions. See
Vermeulen (2002) and Browning et al. (2012) for a survey of bargaining power measures
in collective models.
2Spouses’ relative age, relative income, relative education, relative wages are examples
of distribution factors that have been studied in the literature (Browning et al. 2012;
Chiappori et al. 2002; Lundberg and Pollak 1996; Oreffice 2011; Vermeulen 2002).
3Following convention, the utility from companionship is assumed to be additive and not
to influence the trade-off between leisure and consumption.
4Excluding domestic production does not necessarily bias the estimated effects of distri-
bution factors on welfare (Donni 2008).
5Weight and height are originally reported in pounds and inches, respectively, in
the PSID. The pounds/inches BMI formula is: Weight (in pounds) × 704.5 divided
by Height (in inches) × Height (in inches). Oreffice and Quintana-Domeque (2010)
shown that non-response to body size questions appears to be very small in the
PSID data. Specifically, item non-response for husband’s height is below 1.4% in
each year, for wife’s height is below 1.4% in each year, and for husband’s weight is
below 2.2% in each year. Regarding wife’s weight, item non-response is below 5.5% in
each year.
6We note that Cawley (2000,2004) used the National Health and Nutrition Examina-
tion Survey III (NHANES III) to estimate the relationship between measured height and
weight and their self-reported counterparts. First, he estimated regressions of the cor-
responding measured variable to its self-reported counterpart by age and race. Then,
assuming transportability, he used the NHANES III estimated coefficients to adjust the
self-reported variables from the NLSY. The results for the effect of BMI on wages were
very similar, whether corrected for measurement error or not. Hence, we rely on his find-
ings, and we are confident that our results (based on unadjusted data) are unlikely to be
significantly biased. Recent papers confirm that the BMI-adjustment makes no difference
(see Kelly et al. 2011).
7Longitudinal weights are available throughout the period 1999–2007, whereas cross-
sectional weights are absent for the most recent waves of 2005 and 2007. Consequently,
we consider the entire time period 1999–2007 using longitudinal weights.
8We thank one anonymous referee for this suggestion.
9Explicit modeling of the marital search process can be found in numerous articles (e.g.,
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Becker 1973; Grossbard-Shechtman 1993).
10Note that we do not consider the overidentifying restrictions implied by (5) and (6)
because the corresponding labor supply responses to μ1 and μ2 may be negligible.
11We have also estimated the same regressions including the square of log(own BMI),
without finding evidence of non-linearities (results available upon request).
12Note that estimation of (18) and (19) by LS (or SUR) will lead to biased esti-
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